PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY

DECISIONS SELECTED

FROM

THE ADVANCE

REPORTS.
BANKRUPTCY.
A judgment for the payment of alimony, obtained by a
bankrupt's wife against him, is a "debt" under § I7 a of the
Judgment for Bankrupt Act, which is provable against the bankAlimony
rupt; therefore the wife will be enjoined from
prosecuting her judgment to satisfaction in a state court:
In re Van Arden, 96 Fed. 86.
In Georgia an unrecorded mortgage is good as against the
mortgagor and all persons except subsequent purchasers and
Bankrupt's
Unrecorded

incumbrancers.

-Thepresent bankrupt, residing in

Georgia, executed a mortgage on September 15,

1898. The mortgage was entered for record on
January 19, 1899, at 4 P. ., and on the same day, at 5.45 P.
x., a petition for voluntary bankruptcy was filed. Held, that
Mortgage

the mortgaged property passed to the mortgagee on September 15, 1898, and the transfer was therefore more than four

months previous to the filing of the petition: In re Wright, 96
Fed. 187.
. The general manager of a corporation, who has charge of
the whole business of the corporation at a salary of $ioo per
*'Workmen." month, is not one of the "workmen, clerks or
servants" who are entitled to priority of payment
General
Manager
under § 64b of the Bankrupt Act: In re Grubb-

Wiley Co., 96 Fed. 183.
BILLS AND NOTES.
The Supreme Court of California has announced its adhe-

rence to the now well-settled rule of the law merchant which
requires an indorsement of a negotiable instrument to be upon the instrument itself. Whether
Instrument a valid indorsement may be made upon the face
of the instrument is perhaps an open question and was not
decided by the court. In the present case a note and mortgage had been assigned to the plaintiff by separate instruments
in writing. Held, that while the assignor's title passed, yet
Indorsment

on separate

756

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

BILLS AND NOTES (Continued).

the assignee did not become a holder of the note under the
commercial law, and was liable to be met by the defence of
want of consideration on the part of the maker: Hays v.
Plummer, 58 Pac. 447.
In an action against an executor on a promissory note made
by his testator, the defenbe was payment. It was shown that
Presumption the testator was indebted to the plaintiff in other
of Payment ways besides being liable on the-note, and that he
had given to the plaintiff his note and mortgage for a sum
which would just-about cancel his liabilities to the plaintiff, including his liability ol the note now the subject of the action.
However, the executor was unable to show that the testator
had given the mortgage for the purpose of paying off the notd
held' by plaintiff. The Supreme- Court of California very
properly held that the executor had failed to sustain the burden of proving that the payment by the testator was intended for, and accepted as, a payment of the note in suit:
Grifiths v. Lewin, 58 Pac. 205.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The Circuit Court (D. New Jersey) has declared void, as
regards certain cases, the New Jersey Act of March 30, 1897
Act Depriving (Laws 1897, p. 124), which provides that no action
Corporation
may be brought in any New Jersey court by a
Creditor of
Remedy
creditor of a corporation to enforce a stockholder's
liability arising in a foreign jurisdiction, save an
equitable proceeding, allowed by the statute, for
the benefit of all the creditors. In Western Nat. Bank v.
Reckless, 96 Fed. 70, the plaintiff became, in 1892i, a creditor
of a Kansas corporation, organized under a law of Kansas
which provided, inter alia,that after the creditor had obtained
a fruitless judgment against the corporation, he might sue any
stockholder for an amount equal to the value of his stock.
Plaintiff brought this action against the defendant, a stockholder of the corporation residing in New Jersey, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of New Jersey,
and was met, of course, by a plea setting up the above act of
1897.
The opinion of Judge Gray, ordering judgment for the plaintiff, establishes the following propositions: (I) That the obligation of the defendant, created under the Kansas statute, was
Against
Stockholder
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transitory and could be enforced in any jurisdiction by any
competent court; (2) That the act of 1897 was binding upon
the Federal courts of Ne% Jersey, as well as the state courts;
(3) That the relation between the plaintiff and defendant was a
contract relation, after plaintiff had recovered judgment against
the Kansas corporation; (4) That the act of 1897 deprived the
plaintiff of an integral portion of the remedy, whereby he
could enforce his contract, and the 'deprivation of his direct
right of action was not compensated for by the equitable proceedings allowed under the statute; (5) That therefore the act
of 1897 was unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of
plaintiff's contract.
CORPORATIONS.

The Supreme Court of Illinois has placed itselfsquarelyin line
with the position taken by the Supreme Court of the United States
Acts Uitra

Vires,

in regard to the liability of a corporation, when it

sets up the invalidity of one of its own acts on the
ground that it is ultra vires of itself, to be met by
the answer that it has taken the benefit of the act and is
estopped from setting up its own lack of power. Thus in
Nat'l Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Home Savings Bank, 54 N. E.
619, it was held that a building and loan association, which
had made a contract beyond the scope of its charter, was not
estopped from setting up its invalidity by the fact that it had
reaped the benefits of the transaction. The distinction was
emphasized between acts ultra vires of the corporation itself
and acts of the corporation officers which were irregular, but
which could be ratified by the stockholders. In the one case
the invalidity could be pleaded, in the other case it could not.
In order to make its opinion on the subject clear, the court
quoted several pages from Cent. Transp. Co. v. Pull. Pal. Car
Co., I39 U. S. 24, and Thomas v. R. R. Co., ioi U.S. 7r, and
definitely announced the doctrines therein expressed to be the
law of Illinois. Carter, J., dissenting, announced his adherence
to the Pennsylvania doctrine; that the corporation is estopped
from pleading ultra ires whether the act is beyond the power
of the corporation itself, or merely irregular in that an agent
of the corporation has exceeded his authority, and that, after
the corporation has received the benefit of the act, the state is
the only party competent to raise the question of its validity.
Etop et

Perhaps no question presents greater difficulty than that of
the status of a stockholder in an insolvent corporation, when
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his subscription has been obtained by the fraud of
Right of
Has he a defence
Stockholder the officers of the corporation.
Rescind ofhis to an action by the, receiver for unpaid subs.criptoContract
Subscription tions, and if so, on what grounds? The question
after Insol. generally arises in the suit by the receiver against
veniy

the stockholder, but in Tierney v. Parker,44 At.

15 1, it was substantially'presented in an action by the stock-

holder against the receiver to rescind his contract of subscription. It appeared that the stockholder had been induced to
subscribe in 1889 through the fraudulent representations of
the president of the corporation; that he had received
notice of the fraud in i8go; that the receiver had been appointed in 1893; and that not till then had the stockholder
made any effort to rescind, when he brought this bill. - Upon
these facts the Court of Chancery-of New Jersey held that the
stockholder had possessed the right of rescission when he first
discovered the true facts, but that he had lost his right through
his delay of three years in asserting it. Although the decision
of the court expresses the rule adopted in several jurisdictions,
yet there is a growing feeling of approbation for the English
rule that the liability of the stockholder becomes absolute upon
the insolvency of the corporation. Whether this liability results from an estoppel created by the stockholder by the mere
fact of his name appearing on the books, or whether it arises
from the doctrine that the principles of partnership law apply
to a case like this is a question yet to be decided by the courts.
CRIMINAL LAW.

In In re Breton, 44 Atl. 125, the petitioner, was convicted
upon two complaints for illegally keeping intoxicating liquors,
Simultaneous and received a sentence of sixty days imprisonment in each case. It was not stated which imSentences,
Presumption prisonment should be suffered first, nor that sentence in either case should begin at the expiration
ofTime of
of the sentence of the other. After serving sixty
days the petitioner applied for his release.
The Supreme Court of Maine ordered his discharge, holding that,'in the absence of statutes, if it is not stated in either
of two sentences imposed at the same time that one of them
shall take effect at the expiration of the other, the two periods
of time will run concurrently, and the two punishments
will be executed simultaneously. Citing I Bish. Crim. Proc.
1310.
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In State v. Nordstrom, 58 Pac. 246, the appellant had been
convicted of murder in the first degree. After his case had
instaty of

been taken t vice to the Supreme Court of the

United States, together with sundry appeals to the
Prisoner, Dis
creionof
various courts of Washington and the Circuit
Court
Court of the United States, he was finally sentenced
to be hanged. After his sentence, his counsel suggested to the
court of conviction that he had become insane, and the court,
of its own motion, appointed a committee of physicians to examine the appellant, which committee reported that he was
sane. His couns.1 then moved to have the question of his
sanity submitted before a tribunal where he could be represented by counsel. This motion was dismissed, whereupon an
appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Washington. The
latter court, following Laros v. Comm., 84 Pa. 2o0, and Webber,
v. Comm., i 19 Pa. 223, dismissed the appeal on the ground
that it was not a matter of right, but vested wholly in the
discretion of the trial court. Whether the prisoner has taken
any further appeals does not appear from the report.
Convlcted

DAMAGES.

In McBride v. Sunset Telephone Co., 96 Fed. 81, the plaintiff brought an action against the telephone company for failure
to deliver a message to him, alleging, as his basis
Breach of
for damages, that by reason of the non-delivery of
Contract,
Remote Dam- the message, he was not informed of the death of
ages
his child, and that his apparent outrageous conduct,
in remaining away from his familyat the time, had causedthem to
become estranged from him and to refuse to associate with him,
and also that he had suffered great mental anguish. Held,
dismissing plaintiff's complaint, (i) that mental suffering, by
itself, does not furnish the basis for the recovery of damages,
and (2) that in this case the estrangement of plaintiff's family
was not the natural and probable consequence of the failure to
deliver the message, and therefore could not support the
action.
DEEDS.

In a proceeding for a partition of a decedent's estate, the defendant claimed the land by virtue of a deed from the decedent to him. It was shown that the deed had been
Symbolical
Delivery,
kept by the decedent in his private box at the bank
Evidence
and had never been delivered to the defendant.
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The latter relied upon declarations of the decedent that he had
intended the land for defendant, also upon the fact that the decedent had given defendant his*key to the strong box, thu's
making a symbolical delivery to him of the deed contained
within. However, the defendant was unable to clearly prove
that the key had been given to him for the express purpose of
transferring to him the possession of the deed, and. that it was
not done with the intention of giving him access to certain
other papers. Held, that the defendant had, on the above
facts, failed to sustain the burden of proving a delivery of the
deed : Walls v. Ritter, 54 N. E (Ill.) 565.
EQUITY.
In Fah, v. Cavanagh,44 At. 154, the Court of Chancery
of New Jersey dismissed a bill to compel the performance of
Contract to a written contract to purchase real estate under
the following rather peculiar circumstances :-The
Purchase
Land, Title
title of the vendor depended upon a will, drawn
Depending on
Testimony of evidently by an illiterate man, which, after the deTwo
vises and bequests. contained the following: "ExWitnesses
cetoras of the will, Valentine Burke, Cornelius
McCue." Underneath these names the signature of the testator appeared. At the probate of the will the testimony of
Burke and McCue, who had written their names in the will, as
above, clearly showed that the testator intended their signatures
to be that of witnesses to his will, and that he did not intend
to designate them as executors.
In the bill for specific performance, the Court of Chancery
decided that the will was properly admitted to probate and
that it passed the land under the New Jersey statute requiring
subscribing witnesses, but the court refused to decree specific
performance on the ground that the will, standing alone, was
unwitnessed; therefore the vendor's title to the land depended
upon his ability to call upon the witnesses. at any time, since
the probate of the will would not become conclusive against
the heirs for a number of years. For these reasons the court
concluded that the continued existence of the two witnesses
was too frail a foundation upon which to build a decree of
specific performance.
ESTOPPEL.

A. and others, partners, trading under the firm name of A.
& Co,, owned stock in the B. corporation. In order to qualify
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Allowing

Stock

tStande

Name of

Asother

A. to act as one of the directors of the corporation,
the stock was allowed to stand as in A.'s name.
One
On of A.'s reditors endeavered to attach the
stock as the property of A., and claimed that

A. & Co. were estopped from setting up their ownership.
Held, (I) that in absence of proof that the creditor knew that
the stock was in A.'s name and acted upon such information,

he could not set up the estoppel; (2) that a representation by
A. to the creditor that he was the owner of the stock was in-

sufficient to raise an estopped against A. & Co., although it
might as against A.: N. Y Comm. Co. v. Francis, 96 Fed.
267 (Circ. Ct., N. D. Conn.).
,VIDUNCE.

The Supreme Court of Indiana has decided that where the
question at issue is the competency of a person for a certain
Prooof, I.- duty, evidence of specific acts of negligence on
competence his part is admissible to show that'he is incomby evidence petent. Thus in action against a railroad comoSingle Acts pany to recover for injuries alleged to have been
received by the plaintiff from a doctor in the defendant's hospital, where plaintiff was being treated, the fact that, about
that time, the doctor had performed an operation upon another
person in a negligent and unskillful manner, was held to be
relevant upon the question of the doctor's competency to act
in his position: Wabash R. R. Co. v. Kelley, 54 N. E. 752.
It is well settled that where a witness has testified to certain
facts which lead to an inquiry as to other facts, the witness may
be cross-examined as to these latter facts, even
Self Icrimination,
Testi- though their effect is to incriminate him, and he
mony as to cannot set up his constitutional privilege as a bar.
Separate
But where the issue consists of a number of sepaTransactions

rate transactions, the mere fact that he testifies as

to one does not lay him open to incriminating cross-examination upon the others, even though the transactions are all of
the same character. This distinction is well illustrated by
Evans v. O'Connor, 54 N. E. 557, an action for the seduction
of plaintiff's wife. The plaintiff proved acts of adultery committed by his wife by the defendant in 1893, 1894 and 1895.
The wife was called by the defendant and desired to testify as
to her relations with the defendant in 1893, but not as to those
in 1894 and 1895. She was instructed by the trial judge that
if she testified as to matters in 1893, she could be cross-exam-
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ined fully as to 1894 and 1895, and her constitutional privilege
would be considered as waived; whereupon she refused to
testify. The ruling of the trial judge was held, error, by the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts on the grounds above stated,
namely, that the acts of adultery in 1894 and 1895 were
wholly unconnected with those of 1893, even though they were
material to the issue. The language of Justice .Shepley in
Low v. Mitchell, 18 Me. 372, was quoted with approval.
INSURANCE.

In Kettenring v. N. W. Masonic Aid Ass'n, 96 Fed. 177, an
action was brought upon a policy which provided that "no
~suit at law or in equity shall be maintainable ...
Limitationf
unless the same shall be commenced within twelve
Time for
Bringing Suit months after the death of said insured."
The suit
on Policy
was not brought until twelve months and fifteen
days after the death of the insured, but the plaintiff sought to
excuse his delay on the ground that there was another clause
in the policy providing that the money should be paid within
ninety days after the proof of death had been received; that
the true intention was that the twelve months should run from
the expiration of the ninety-day period, so as to give the beneficiary twelve full months in which to sue. Following the
weight of authority, Judge Kohlsaat held that the limitation
clause was plain and unambiguous, and he dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.
The question of construction of the so-called "American
clause" in marine policies has recently come before the Supreme
Construction Court of Massachusetts.

of the
"American
Clause"

The clause in question,

contained in a policy issued by the defendant company, read as follows: "Other insurance upon the
premises aforesaid, of date the same day as this

instrument, shall be deemed simultaneous herewith, and the
said company shall not be liable for more than a ratable contribution in the proportion of the sum by them insured, to the
aggregate of such simultaneous insurance."
The above policy was issued on August 2, 1895, aind another
policy was taken out on the same cargo, dated and issued
August 14, 1895. However, by their terms, both policies went
into effect on August 21, 1895, at noon. Were these policies of
"even date?"
The court decided that they were not; that the
above clause referred solely to the date of the execution of the
policies; and the mere fact that they went into effect sitnulta-

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

INSURANCM

(Continued).

neously was immaterial : Carleton v. China Mut. Ins. Co., 54
N. E. 559Actual delivery of a policy of insurance to the insured is not
necessary in all cases to complete the contract. Thus in
Crawfordv. Trans-Atlantic Is. Co., 58 Pac. i77,
Delvr o
the policy was prepared on April 30, x897, as a
s'.,cy.
result of the negotiations between the insured and
Evulsthe agent of the company. By its terms the policy was to go

into effect on May 2d, at noon.

On May ist the agent sought

the insured for the purpose of making the delivery, but was
unable to find him, and retained possession of it on May 2d,
which was Sunday, on which night the property was burned.
The policy was deposited at a bank, and a few days later the
insured tendered the premium and demanded delivery, which
was refused. The Supreme Court of California held that the
question of the completion of the contract was properly left to
the jury, and that declarations of the agent, to the effect that
the deal had been completed, were admissible to fasten the
liability upon the company.
JUDGmENTS.
The Court of Chancery of New Jersey has affirmed the
familiar doctrine that a judgment in personam against a nonresident of a state without personal service is void
Judgeat
winhi.t p, under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitusonal service. tion of the United States. In the present case, a
decree of divorce and alimony had been obtained
c,,tera
in New Jersey against the defendant, who was then
Attack
a resident of Missouri, without personal service. In an application for a ne ezeat to prevent the defendant from leaving New
Jersey without securing the payment of the alimony, it was
held that the invalidity of the former decree, being based upon
the want of jurisdiction of the court, could be successfully
attacked in this collateral proceeding: Emendorfv. FImendorf,
44 AtL x64.
LIBEL AND SLANDER.

In Sherwood v. Kyle, 58 Pac. 270, it appeared that while the
plaintiff, a schoolmistress, was sitting in the schoolroom with
her pupils, the defendant entered the room and
D.ma.es,
Discretion of

Trfal Court

said to her, "You have no business to be in charge
of young children. You are no more fit to teach

school than hell is fora powder house." In an action for slander
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the plaintiff recovered a verdict of.$ Iooo. The trial court
made an order granting a new trial unless the plaintiff would
remit $76o, which plaintiff refused to do, and a new trial. was
ordered. From this order an appeal was taken. The Supreme
Court of California held that the above facts would not justify
them in interfering with the discretion of the trial court in the
matter of damages, and the decision was probably correct,
although one whose acquaintance with the case is limited to a
reading of the report would be inclined to agree with the jury,
rather than with the judge.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

The Court of Chancery of New Jersey has properly decided
that where a servant has been engaged by a firm to work in
their manufactory, and the servant examines the
Discharge,
Excuse
books of the firm without the consent of his employers, such action on his part, not being connected with the
work for which he is engaged, constitutes a breach of faith,
and furnishes his master with a sufficient excuse for discharging him: Allen v. Ayleswortk, 44 AtI. 178.
A mate of a ship is not a fellow servant with one of the
seamen, so as to cause the latter to assume the risks of the
Mate of Ship, mate's negligence. Also, the obedience by the
Relation to
seaman on board the ship at sea to the orders of
Seaman
the mate is not negligence, even though the seaman knows the danger. His is a duty of imperative obligation : Keating v. Pacific Steam Whaling CO., 58 Pac. (Wash.)
224.
NEGLIGENCE.

The Supreme Court of Kansas refuses to lay down a rule
of law that a traveller upon a highway must stop before crossDuty to stop, ing a railroad, but it decides whether this duty is
Look and
present upon the facts of each case. Thus where
Listen
a traveller was approaching a track through a
grove of trees bordered by a high hedge, and it was shown
that he could not hear the train on account of the rustling of
the trees, and that there was an opening in the hedge twentyeight feet from the track, through which he could have had a
clear view of the track if he had stopped, it was held that his
failure to stop charged him, as a matter of law, with contributory negligence: Atchison, Etc., R. R. Co. v. Willey, 58 Pac. 472.
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In Lake Shore Rwy. v. Kelsey, 54 N. E. 6o8, it appeared
that plaintiff boarded one cf defendant's trains; that the platStanding an form of the car was so crowded that he was unCrowded,
able to get further than the lowest step; that he
stood there, clinging to the railings, and that his
P atfor
body projected such a distance out from the line of the train
that he was struck by a train on the next track. The company contended, and, it would seem, with some reason, that
the position assumed by plaintiff clearly showed contributory
negligence on his part, but the Supreme Court of Illinois decided that the question of contributory negligence had been
properly left to the jury.
PARDONS.

The Court of Appeals of New York has decided a rather
curious case on the effect of.a pardon. In Roberts v. State,
What the 54 N. E. 678, the petitioner, who had been convicted of burglary, was pardoned by the governor.
Pardon
Imports

The legislature then passed a special act author-

izing the petitioner to present a claim before the Board of Claims
for damages sustained by his "improper conviction and punishment." When the case was heard by the board, the evidence
showed clearly that the petitioner was guilty and had been
justly convicted, and the petitioner's claim was disallowed.
On appeal it was urged that the effect of the pardon was to
declare that the petitioner was innocent, and the board had no
right to hear evidence of his guilt. The Court of Appeals
held that the effect of the pardon was, if anything, to declare
the petitioner guilty, otherwise there would have been nothing
to pardon; that the pardon relieved him from future punishment, but had no retroactive effect; therefore the petitioner
had no claim udder the statute, since his conviction was not
"improper."
PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

In Boardman v. Creighton, 44 Atl. 121, an action was
brought by a widow for the death of her husband, who had
been killed by a fall of rock while working in the
Deelaratio,

forNegligence

defendants' quarry.

The declaration alleged that

the plaintiff "was then and there employed and was lawfully
at work in the said defendants' quarry by the license and permission of said defendants and at their request." The lower
court sustained a demurrer to the declaration, which ruling
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was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Maine on the ground
that the declaration did not allege under what -circumstances
the decedent was in the quarry and what his relation was to
the defendants; whether he was the defendants' servant or the
servant of an independent contractor, or a mere licencee, since
a different degree of care would be demanded of the defendants in each case.
STATUTES.

The Washington Code (188 1, § 812) provided that the rape
of a child under 12 years of age should be punishable by life
Conviction imprisonment or less, in the discretion of the
under
court. In I886 the age of consent was-raised
Amended

In 1893 the petitioner
Statute, Un- from 12 to I6 years.
constitutional ravished a child under the age of 16 years, and

subsequently the amendment of 1886 was held unconstitutional for the reason that its object was not expressed
in the title. The petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus
on the ground that he was sentenced and imprisoned -under an
invalid law. Held, affirming a judgment denying the writ,
that the mere fact that the amendment was void did not render
void the act of 1881 defining the crime and fixing the punishment, which had never been ousted by the unconstitutional
amendment; therefore the criminal court had jurisdiction, and
the regularity of its sentence could not be collaterally attacked
on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus: In re Nolan, 58 Pac.
Amendment

(Wash.) 222.
WILLS.

The testator bequeathed $5oo apiece "to the children of Dr.
James B. Strafford." It appeared that the testator left a
Designation of brother, Joseph B.Strafford, who was a physician,
Legatee,
and a nephew, James B. Straforbd, who was not.
Latent Am- Since the difficulty arose only from the description
bigulty
of the legatee, the court decided that this was a
case of a latent ambiguity, and admitted parol evidence to show
that James B. Strafford, while not a doctor, had once been a
clerk in a drug store, and was commonly known among his
associates as " Dr." or "Doc."
Upon this evidence the court
decided that the intent of the testator was clear, and awarded
the legacies to the children of James B. Strafford: Atterbury
v. Strafford, 44 At. (N. J.) i6o.

